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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a method measuring.presidentia1 coat- 
tail effects on Senate races by using aggregate voting data. . '  
. : - 
The measurement is based on the 'assumpti-on that' in'each 
. . 
state, there is a certain fairly stable percentage which 
constitutes the normal vote for each party. The coat-tail 
measurement, which we call the C-correlation, is the state 
by state correlation between that part of the Presidential 
vote not attributable to party loyalty and that part of the 
Senate vote also not attributabJe to party loyalty. The C- 
correlations were computed for a.sample of states for the 
1956, 1960 and 1964 elections. The elections of 1956 
and 1964 produce large and highly significant C-correlations 
indicating the clear presence of coat-tail effects. Inter- 
estingly, the C-correlation for 1956 is higher than for 1964. 
The C-correlation for 1960 was near zero. 
Both practitioners and analysts of.electora1 politics 
believe that coat-tail effects play an important role in deter- 
1/ 2 /  mining the outcome of congressional elections.- Yet, as Miller- 
clearly shows, it is very difficult' to use aggregate voting data 
to assess the importance of these presumed coat-tail effects, 
If, for example, the President runs well ahead of his party, 
as did Eisenhower in 1956, the- large gap between the President 
and his party may be taken to indicate the absence of a coat- 
tail effect. If on the other hand, the President's party runs 
as well as he does this can be taken to mean that the Presidefit 
is no more popular than his party and there is once again no 
coat-tail effect. I 
In this paper, I will present an attempt at doing what 
Miller said could not be done--I will present a method of 
analyzing aggregate voting data to determine the existence 
of and strength of Presidential coat-tail effects on Senator- 
ial contests. This method will then be applied to the elec- 
tions of 1956, 1960 and 1964. The 1968 election was excluded 
because of the complications resulting from the third party 
candidacy of George Wallace. 
The measurement I am.proposing is based on the following 
assumptions and definitions. We can regard the outcome of an 
election as being determined by two kinds'of factors. One is 
the normal party identification of the voters (which we shall 
call N) . ~onverse~/has hown that this remains fairly constant 
over time. The other kinds of factors are short term forces and 
include such things as the personal attractiveness of the 
. ,  candidates and short term fluctuations in the popularity of 
a party or administration. 
~ i l l e r y  defined a coat-tail influenced vote for 
Congress as a vote in which the Congressional vote decision 
(as well as the Presidential) is motivated by the appeal of 
the Presidential candidate. Since the personal appeal of can- 
didates. is a factor in the short term forces, applying ~iller's 
definition to the situation at hand has the following implica- 
tions. If the short-term forces associated with the Presi- 




find that where a Presidential. candidate received many votes 
attributable to short term forces (not to stable party loyalty) -
the Senatorial candidate of his party should have also received 
.many votes attributable to short ' te~m' forces. Analogously, 
where the Presidential candidate received few votes attribut- 
able to short term forces, the Senatorial candidates of his 
party should likewise have received.few such votes. This 
suggests that our measurement of coat-tail effects be some 
measure of association between that part of the Presidential 
vote attributable to short term forces and that part of the 
Senatorial vote also attributable to short-term forces. 
To simply do a state by state correlation of the vote 
percentages received by Presidential and Senatorial candi- 
dates of the same party would however be tp miss the whole. 
point of the definition of coat-tail effect. A large part of 
. . the vote in each state is determined by stable party loyalty . .  . 
rather than short-term forces. Since the N's of the differ- 
ent states vary ~jreatly, regardless of the existence of 
coat-tail effects we would expect such a correlation to be 
quite high, reflecting the different N's of the different 
states and masking the effects of short term forces. Hence, 
a correlation which controls for the different N's of the 
different states will be introduced. 
Let P be the percentage of the total Presidential vote 
cast in .a state whichwas received by the- Democratic candidate 
for President. Let S be the percentage of the total vote cast .. 
for Senator which was received by the Democratic Senatorial 
candidate in a state. Our measurement of the coat-tail 
effect'of a given e1ection.i~ the state by state correlation 
between P - N and S - N. 
W e  now ' want to operationalize N. converse?' meahures~ 
. .  . 
with survey data. I will measure:.it .with aggregate voting date. 
Since Converse has shown N to have been quite stable na- 
tionally between 1954 and 1964, we'will assume that it was 
stable in each state. ~ence we will take N for each state 
to be the average of the Democratic percentage of the total 
Congressional vote (in a11 districts--excluding at large 
. . 
races) for 1954 and 1962.   his' quantity we shall call C,. 
We now have three questions to answer. 
(1) Why do we think Congressional elections provide 
a good basis for measuring N? 
( 2 )  Why are we using only off.-year elections? 
( 3 )  Why are we excluding 1958? 
I have two reasons for believing that Congressional 
elections provide a good measure of party loyalty. (a) Most 
people-vote fot.Congress on the basis of party rather than 
personality./ (b) Where there- are more than a very small 
number of Congressmen in a state, the-effects of personal 
appeal (or other short.term forces relevant to a specific 
, . 
race) should average out so as not to be a'signlficant- factor 
in the state wide percentage for each party. 
We do not use. Congressional elections.' in Pres.identia1 
years in measuring N because, if there are coat-tail effects 
from the Presidential election these would then influence 
our- measurement of N. While off year Gubernatorial and/or 
Senatorial elections might also influence the Congressional 
vote in a state, we assyme that the lesser saliency of these 
offices would result in smaller coat-tail effects. 
Both election data and accounts of the 1958 elections 
make me wary about using the results of that election in 
computing N. In that election, the Democrats rolled to a 
huge victory doing much better than in either of the other 
off-year elections. The country had a Republican President 
and was in the midst of a substantial recession at the time 
of the election. Moreover, in certain states the Republicans 
added to the short-term anti-Republican forces by their 
support of "right-to-work" laws. 
-5- 
Having defined my measure, I now wish to demonstrate 
its use. The following hypothetical examples will help 
to illustrate the difference between using the correlation 
between P and S on the one hand, and my "C-correlation" on 
the other hand (The C in C-correlation stands for both 
coat-tail and Congressional). 
Table 1 about here 
In all of the above examples both the Pearson correla- 
tions and the Spearman (rank-order) correlations between P 
and S are.+l. The C-correlations however, tell quite a dif- 
ferent tale. In example 1, the C-correlation is +1, in 
example 2, -1, and in example 3, it is zero. 
These C-correlations are.consistent wi'th my conceptual- 
ization of what a coat-tail effect is and isn't. We would 
not want to infer from example 3 that there is a coat-tail 
effect since- the Senatorialvote in each state is directly 
attributable to normal party loyalty. A negative C-corre1atich-i 
such as in example 2, suggests a negative coat-tail effect as 
might occur if there were great animosity between the Presi- 
dential and Senatorial candidates. Only example 1 is consis- 
tent with my conception of a coat-tail effect. 
For the elections under consideration (1956, 1960 and 
1964) C-correlations were computed for a sample of states. 
The states in the sample were chosen as follows. Because 
they are usually highly competitive, because they contain 
Many congressional districts and because I was interested 
id them, I favored the big states in my sample. Because 
\ 
Table 1. Hypothetical results used to 
illustrate C-correlation. 
b 
( %  Democratic) 
C - P - S - 
(1) State A 40 45 45 
State B 60 55 55 
(2) State A 40 45 35 
State B 60 55 65 
(3) State A 40 45 40 
State B 60 55 60 
-. 
they did not have fully devel'oped-two party systems and 
because Democratic Senatorial candidates from the region 
frequently dissociated themselves from the national 
ticket, I excluded the states of the old Confederacy. 
States with only one Congressional district were also 
excluded. Beyond this the rest of the sampling procedure 
systematically attempted to represent.the range of partisan 
. . ,  leanings, from strongly Democratic to strongly Republican. 
Due to sampling procedures, the farm belt and mountain states 
are somewhat under represented. . . 
The data.and the C-correlations are'given in the tables 
following. 
Discussion of Results 
. . . I . .  The results indicate very decided coat-tail effects 
for the 1956 and 1964 elections and a slight negative result 
. . ,  for 1960. These results are partially consistent and partially 
. . 
inconsistent with other knowledge. and beliefs about coat-tail 
effects. The fact that the C-correlation for 1960 is the 
smallest is consistent with 'what seems to be a comrnonl~ helil 
belief that 'coat-tail effects are most pronounced when the 
head of the ticket is extremely popular and wins'by a landslide. 
. Tables 2, 3a, :3b, 3c about here 
--- - - 
On the other hand, while Campbell and ~illerl'use survey 
data to demonstrate the existence of a coat-tail effect for 
Table 2. Congressional Voting Data (Used to 
Calculate C) 
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All election data presented,in this paper are taken from: 
a] Scammon, Richard M. (ed. ) America Votes. Governmental 
Affairs Institute, 1956-57, 1960, 1964. 
b) Statistics of the Presidential and Conqressional Elections. 
U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Table 2 cont'd 
** In New York, votes cast for the.Democratic candidate on 
another party line (usually Liberal) are counted as part 
of the Democratic vote. Votes on line which were for 
candidates not also on the Democratic line were counted 
as .part of the total vote but not as part of the Democratic 
vote. 
Table 3A. 1956 Election 
% Democratic 
State Presidential 1956 Senatorial 1956 Incumbency 














1 :  C correlation = .89 I 
I * ,For explanation of I see Page 12. 
**In New York, votes cast for the Democratic candidate on 
another party line (usually Liberal) are,counted as part 
of the Democratic vote. Votes on line which were for 
candidates not also on the Democratic line were counted -
as part of the total vote but not as part of the Democratic 
vote. 
Table 3B. 1960 Election 
. . 
r 
Presidential 1960 . Senatorial 1960 Incumbency* 
Colorado 44.9 45.8 -1 
Illinois 50.0 54.7 +1 
Iowa 43.2 48.1 0 
Maine 43.0 38.4 -1 
Massachusetts 60.2 43.5 -1 
Michigan 50.9 51.7 +1 
i 
Minnesota 50.6 57.5 +1 
Missouri 50.3 53.1 +1/2 
Montana 48.6 50.7 0 
Nebraska 37.9 41.1 -1 
New Jersey 50.0 43.2 -1 
Oregon 47.3 54.5 0 
Rhodz Island 63.6 68.9 0 
South Dakota 41.8 47.6 -1 
West Virginia 52.7 55.3 +1 
C Correlation = -.I15 1 
* For explanation of I see Page 12. 
- 
Table 3C. 1964' Election 
I 
% Democratic - 
State Presidential 1964 Senatorial 1964 Incumbency 
P S I * 
-d..._ 
California 59.1 48.5 + 1/2 
Connecticut 67.8 64.6 +1 
Massachusetts 76.2 74.3 +1 
Maine 68.8 66.6 +1 
Michigan 66.7 64.4 +1 
Minnesota 63.8 60.5 +1 
Montana 58.9 64.5 +1 
Nebraska 52.6 38.6 -1 
New Jersey 65.6 61.9 +1 
New York** 68.6 53.5 -1 
Ohio 62.9 50.2 +1 
Pennsylvania 64.9 49.1 -1 
Rhode Island 80.9 82.7 +1 
Washington 62.0 72.2 +1 
West Virginia 67.9 67.7 +1 
Correlation = .66 
** In New York, votes cast for the Democratic candidate on 
another party line (usually Liberal) are counted as part 
of the Democratic vote. Votes on any line which were for I 
candidates not also on the Democratic line were counted 1 
as part of the total vote but not as part of the Democratic 
vote. 
* For explanation of I see Page 12. 
4956,- it is nonetheless surprising to find that we have 
a-larger C-correlation for 1956 than for 1964. In 1956 
. . .  
Eisenhower won: by a landslide while the ' Republicans won 
neither house of Congress, whereas in 1964, huge eofigress&onal 
majorities were swept in with Johnson. In answer to writeFs 
such as bIeyery who hold the view that Eisenhower did not 
have coat-tails, I would say that our results indicate the 
following. Almost everywhere, Eisenhower was more popular 
than his party, but,where the short'term forces for Eisen- 
hower were strongest, Republican Senatorial candidates also 
did best. To put it another way, in all states in our sample, 
it 'seems that many more independent-voters.and weak party 
identifiers voted for Eisenhower than for the Republican 
candidate.! for the Senate. On the other hand, the more 
such voters who voted for Eisenhower, the more such voters 
I 
voted Republican for Senator.. 
Since I have justified the claim that the high C- 
correlation for I956 indicates a clear coat-tail effect, 
I should explain why it is reasonable for us to' have gotten 
a lower C-correlation for 1964. Perhaps we can do this 
best by considering an extreme case, which is like 1964 
in that both the Democratic candidate for President and 
most Democratic candidates for Senate do considerably 
better than the normal vote for each state but where the 
C-correlation is near zero or even negative. 
Such a result would be explained in the following ways. 
(a) Many of. these individual Senatorial races generated 
their own short-term forces--i.e. the Democrats had 
attractive Senatorial candidates in most, states, or (b) 
there. were. widespread pro-~emocratic. short-ten forces.. 
which.were independent of the appeal of the Democratic 
Pres.identia1 candidate--if these forces - had been dependent 
on the President, they would have, had the strongest effect 
on Senatorial contests where the short-term forces for the 
President were strongest. 
In neither of the above two possibilities is the 
explanation consistent with our definition of coat-tail 
effects. Hence, just as the fact that Eisenhower did 
much better than other candidates of his party does not 
, 
prove the absence of a coat-tail effect so the fact that 
a President and Senatorial candidates of his party may win 
quite handsomely does not in itself prove the existence of 
coat-tails. 
While .I believe the preceding arguments have helped 
to justify the- use of the C-correlation as a measurement 
of whether Presidential coat-tails influence Senatorial 
contests, situations such as 1956 indicate an important 
drawback of this measurement. It does not measure how -
much. difference the Presidential contest made in the outcome . . 
of the average Senate race or of any individual Senate race, 
Having seen and interpreted these correlations, we 
have two further questions. 1) Are these correlations 
siqnificant?, 1n.other words, did we get these correla- 
tions because. there is some basis for inferring a causal 
relationship between P-N and S-N or simply because.the 
states in which a Presidential candidate does well also 
happen to have. appealing Senatorial candidates of the 
same party? 2 )  If these correlations are significant, 
then which way does the causal relationship work? Is it 
the Presidential race which influences the Senatorial 
or vice versa, or is it both ways? 
To answer the second question'first, contingency 
data such as we have can never tell us the direction of 
causation.. On the other hand it-is a common- conviction 
among-political scientists that by far the.most salient 
election in a Presidential year is the Presidential 
election. If true, this would strongly suggest that the 
major direction of causation should be the Presidential 
race influencing the others. 
But how can we reconcile saying that the President 
pulls the Senators on his coat-tails with situations such 
as President Johnson winning Washington with 62.0% of the 
vote while Senator Jackson was. being re-elected with 72.2% 
of the state's vote? We have two answers. 1) Perhaps if 
Johnson had done better in that state then Jackson 
would have also done better and if Johnson had done 
worse then Jackson wou-ld have also done worse. 2 )  The 
existence of a general coat-tail effect for an election 
does not require that such an effect influence the out- 
comes of all contests on that election day. -
We now try to answer the question of significance. 
We do this by imagining that in all states, Senatorial 
candidates are randomly selected from a large population 
of potential candidates, whose personal appeals are 
normally distributed. If we regard the'outcome of each 
Senate contest as being a function of the difference in 
the popularity of the two candidates (it is also a function 
of the states'N and the popularity of the Presidential 
candidates) then these outcomes should also be normally dis- 
tributed. Assuming the selection process described above, 
we can now ask, what the true correlation P 
variables P-C and S-C must be to give us our experimentally 
determined C-correlations. 
Using the Fischer Test gives us the following 95% 
confidence intervals for the t=ue correlations: 
The above results indicateythat the C-correlations for 
1956 and 1964 are indeed sign,ificantly different from zero. 
Therefore the positive associations between P-C and S-C 
for those years are not chance events. We also see that the 
result for 1960 is not significantly different from' zero. 
Since there may. be some question as'to whether the distribu- 
tions of P-C and S-C are bivariate normal and whether we have 
a sufficient number of states in our sample to use the 
Fischer test, the confidence intervals above may not be 
valid. To answer any such. objections I have done an 
alternate test which makes no questionable assumptions 
about sample- size or distribution. - I have computed 
the Spearman rank order correlations between P-C and 
S-c and have done significance tests based on these qorre- 
lations. The Spearman correlat.ions and,the. significance , 




While there is.little questionable about the signifi- 
cance tests based on the Spearman correlation (about the 
only questionable thing I can think of is the fact that 
the sample was not completely random) there may still be 
some nagging feeling that the results are spurious. In 
particular, since incumbent Senators seeking re-election 
are believed to do better than non-incumbents, it might . 
be thought that our results stem from-the presence of 
popular incumbents of the President's party in states 
where the President is also personally popular. One'way 
of checking this out 1s to take the' C-correlations. controlling 
for incumbency. Recalling that 
we proceed to calculate the necessary correlations. We 
let variable 1 be P-C, 2 be S-C and 3 be the incumbency 
variable I. In calculating K 3  and. r23 we assign 
values. of I as follows. A previously elected Demcratic 
incumbent gets a score of +l. A Democratic incumbent 
appointed to fill, out a term but having-never been elected 
in his own right gets +1/2. If neither is an incumbent, 
we assign zero to the contest. Republican incumbents are 
given analogous negative scores. The data from these 
calculations are given below in Table 4. 
Table 4 about .here.. 
The above correlations yield several noteworthy results. 
(a) As both an impressionis'tic look at our. data and 
conventional wisdom led us to suspect, there are clear 
r positive correlations. ( 23) between incumbency and the 
Senate vote attributable to short term forces. 
(b) The value of the partial. correlation ria. 3 for 
1960 st~ongly suggests that the election was characterized 
by the absence of a coat-tail effect rather than by the 
slight though. not statistically significant negative 
effect shown by the uncontrolled C-correlation. 
(c) For both 1956 and 1964, the strong positive 
correlations between P-C and S-C are clearly not attributable 
Table 4 .  . Intercorrelations involving 
Incumbency 
to the effects of incumbency. This is particularly signi-. 
f icant because of the clear positive correlations between 
I and S-C. The fact that the values of rz3 are positive 
indicates that incumbency can be used as a measure (albeit 
a very imperfect one) of the re1ative:popularity of. 
Senatorial candidates. Moreover it is. a measurement 
which 'is- independent of the.,ef f ects of the., Presidential 
. . 
race. Hence in our partial correlations we are in some 
real sense controlling for the effects ~f personal appeal 
. . 
in Senate- races. The fact that th,is does .little- t o  the 
correlation betweeh P-C and S-C is further evidence that . 
our C-correlations were neither chance events nor caused by 
the intervening variable of incumbency. 
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